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余地がある。本稿は、慣用的含意を引き起こす表現の主な候補（supplements, expressives, therefore, 
manage to, only, stop ~ing）について調べ、慣用的含意と前提の関係を議論する。慣用的含意と前提はと
もに独立した概念を形成するが、その定義と性質には明確化の余地があることがわかった。
 Grice (1989) divided the meaning of an utterance into what is said (“explicature”) and what is implicated 
(“implicature”), and the latter in turn he divided into conversational implicature and conventional 
implicature. Conversational implicatures are generated on the basis of cooperative principles, whereas 
conventional implicatures are generated on the basis of lexical items or constructions. Independently of this, 
the notion of presupposition was introduced by Strawson (1950/2013) as contrasting with assertion. Some 
presuppositions are triggered by lexical items or constructions and others by conversational factors. A 
question then is the relation between implicature and presupposition. The literature presents different views 
on this matter. In particular, the status of conventional implicature in the ontology of meaning leaves room 
for clarification. This paper investigates major candidates for the triggers of conventional implicatures (i.e., 
supplements, expressives, therefore, manage to, only, stop ~ing) and discusses the relation between 
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 Grice (1989) divided the meaning of an utterance 
into what is said (“explicature”) and what is 
implicated (“implicature”), and the latter in turn he 
divided into conversational implicature and 
conventional implicature (CI). Conversational 
implcatures are generated on the basis  of 
cooperative principles, whereas CIs are generated on 
the basis of particular lexical items or constructions. 
Independently of this, the notion of presupposition 
was introduced by Strawson (1950/2013) as 
contrasting with assertion. Some presuppositions 
are triggered by lexical items or constructions and 
others by contextual factors. A question then is the 
relation between implicature and presupposition. 
 The literature presents different views on this 
matter. In particular, the status of CI leaves room for 
clarification. For example, Levinson (1983) and 
Huang (2014), among many others, have independent 
chapters for implicature and presupposition, offering 
little, if any, discussion about the relation between the 
two. In contrast, Karttunen and Peters (1979) propose 
reducing presupposition to CI, whereas Bach (1999) 
argues against the very notion of CI. Potts (2005) 
investigates CI, focusing on two categories which he 
calls supplements and expressives. 
 This paper investigates major candidates for the 
triggers of CI and discusses the relation between CI 
and presupposition. Section 2 provides a literature 
review, section 3 investigates major candidates for 
the triggers of CIs, section 4 discusses the relation 
between CI and presupposition, and section 5 
concludes the paper.
2.  Literature review
 I first provide a historical background for the key 
notions of conversational implicature, CI, and 
presupposition (section 2.1), and then give an 
overview of recent work (section 2.2).
2.1  Historical Background
 In Grice (1989), the meaning of an utterance is 
divided into what is said (“explicature”) and what is 
implicated (“implicature”). By the former, Grice 
means the “at-issue entailment” (Abbott, 2000; 
Potts, 2005) of the utterance. Implicature in turn is 
classified as either conversational implicature or CI. 
 Conversational implcatures are generated through 
inferences made based on cooperative principles, 
which consist of the broad cooperative principle (i.e., 
“Be cooperative”) and four subordinate maxims (i.e., 
maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner). 
For example, the utterance (1) generates a 
conversational implicature that the speaker has 
exactly two sisters, by virtue of the maxim of 
quantity, which says 1) Make your contribution as 
informative as is required (for the current purpose of 
the exchange), and 2) Do not make your contribution 
more informative than is required (Grice, 1989).
(1)  I have two sisters.
Logically, (1) means that the speaker has at least 
two sisters. However, if the speaker utters (1) when 
conventional implicatures and presupposition. 
 The notion and classification of presupposition vary in the literature, as does the treatment of conventional 
implicature. In order to examine the status of the expressions in question, the following criteria were used: 
the definition of conventional implicature provided by Potts (2005); the backgrounded property for 
presuppositions; and the constancy under negation test for presuppositions. It was found that both 
conventional implicature and presupposition deserve an independent label but their definition and properties 




s/he has three sisters, for example, s/he is providing 
less information than is needed. In order to be 
cooperative, s/he should say “three” instead. By 
“two” in (1), s/he is expected to mean “exactly two”. 
It is worth noting that conversational implicatures, 
unlike CIs, are cancellable. For example, the 
continuation in (2) below sounds fine.
(2)  I have two sisters. In fact I have three.
 The following dialogue between Fred and Ann 
illustrates one more example of conversational 
implicature:
(3)  Fred:  Do you have the time?
    Ann: Well, the museum is not open yet. 
 (Huang, 2014, p. 34, with my modifications)
Fred is indirectly asking what time it is. Ann’s reply 
does not provide a direct answer to this question. 
However, Ann conversationally implicates that it is 
before the time when the museum opens (e.g., 10 
a.m.). Fred can get this implicature by assuming that 
Ann is following the maxim of relation (“Be 
relevant”). 
 Conversational implicatures can be generated not 
only by following (or “observing”) the maxims but 
also by flouting the maxims. For example, by uttering 
an irrelevant thing in reply to someone’s utterance, 
one can generate a conversational implicature that s/
he doesn’t want to continue the topic given by the 
addressee (For more details about conversational 
implicature, see Levinson [1983] and Huang [2014], 
as well as Grice [1989]). 
 CIs, in contrast with conversational implicatures, 
are generated on the basis of particular lexical items 
or constructions. Grice (1989) offers therefore as an 
example of such a lexical item in the sentence below.
(4)   He is an English man; he is, therefore, brave. 
(Grice, 1989, p. 25)  
Grice argues that if he says (4), “I have certainly 
committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my 
words, to its being the case that his being brave is a 
consequence of (follows from) his being an English 
man” (p. 25, original parentheses). Grice also 
mentions that the falsehood of the above-mentioned 
consequence relation does not affect the truth 
condition of the sentence, as he notes, “I do not want 
to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, 
strictly speaking, false should the consequence in 
question fail to hold” (pp. 25-26, original italics).
 Independently of (and in fact much earlier than) 
Grice’s (1989) work, the notion of presupposition was 
introduced by Strawson (1950/2013) as contrasting 
with assertion, although Strawson did not use the term 
‘presupposi t ion’ in  his  1950 paper.  Some 
presuppositions are triggered by lexical items or 
constructions (“presupposition triggers”) and others 
by contextual factors (e.g., Huang, 2014; Potts, 2005; 
Simons, 2013).
 To take a classic example:
(5)  The king of France is bald.
Following Strawson (1950/2013), sentence (5) 
assumes (or ‘presupposes’) that there is a unique 
individual who has the property of being the king of 
France. This assumption should hold in order for (5) 
to be true or false. Otherwise, sentence (5) lacks a 
truth value, resulting in a truth value gap. This kind 
of assumption introduced in terms of truth condition 
is called semantic presupposition. Presupposition 
triggers create a large, heterogeneous set (e.g., 
Huang, 2014; Levinson, 1983). The following 
illustrate other examples of presupposition triggers 
(italicized):
(6)  a. Susan stopped beating her boyfriend.
      b. Susan started beating her boyfriend.
The predicate stop ~ing in (6a) triggers the presupposition 
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that Susan was beating her boyfriend. The predicate start 
~ing in (6b) triggers the presupposition that Susan was 
not beating her boyfriend. Predicates of this kind 
(“change of state predicates”) are thus presupposition 
triggers. 
 The notion of presupposition has been discussed 
from a pragmatic perspective too. Pragmatic 
presupposition is the condition in order for an utterance 
to be felicitous. Keenan (1971) introduces pragmatic 
presupposition with the example of the tu/vous 
distinction in the second person singular in French. 
This distinction expresses the relationship holding 
between speaker and addressee, and, importantly, it 
does not affect the truth condition of the sentence in a 
context. Levinson (1983, p. 205) defines pragmatic 
presupposition in terms of a common ground:
(7)   An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a 
proposition B iff A is felicitous only if B is in 
the common ground of the participants.  
 (with my modifications, original italics)
This definition is challenged by Lewis (1979), who 
proposed the principle of accommodation (p. 340). 
Huang (2014) observes: “accommodation provides an 
explanation for how missing proportions required by 
what has been said by the speaker can be accepted. In 
other words, the addressee accommodates to the 
speaker” (p. 108). Thus, presuppositions need not be 
in the common ground of participants at the utterance 
time: they can be ‘repaired’. To put it differently, 
presuppositions are also generated conversationally. 
 Presuppositions have certain properties. One 
property is “constancy under negation” (Huang, 2014, 
p. 89): The (semantic) presupposition of an affirmative 
sentence survives under negation. For example:
(8)  a. Susan stopped beating her boyfriend.
      b. Susan didn’t stop beating her boyfriend.
The presupposition of the affirmative sentence (8a) 
(i.e., Susan was beating her boyfriend) is also the 
presupposition of the negative sentence (8b). This 
property is commonly used for a test of presupposition.
2.2  Recent Work
 The literature presents various views on implicature 
and presupposition (e.g., Abbott, 2000, 2016; Atlas, 
2004; Beaver & Geurts, 2012; Beaver, Roberts, 
Simons, & Tonhauser, 2009; Grice, 1989; Gutzmann, 
2015; McCready, 2010; Potts, 2015; Simons, 2013; 
Soames, 2005/2006). In particular, the status of CI 
leaves room for clarification. Levinson (1983) and 
Huang (2014), among many others, have independent 
chapters for implicature and presupposition, without 
mentioning, at least directly, how the two notions are 
related to each other. Karttunen and Peters (1979) 
propose reducing presupposition to CI. Bach (1999), 
on the other hand, argues against the very notion of 
CI. 
 Abbott (2000) discusses cases such as (9). 
(9)   In her talk, Baldwin introduced the notion that 
syntactic structure is derivable from pragmatic 
principles. (p. 1426, original italilcs)
Following Abbott, the italicized definite NP in (9) 
triggers a presupposition about the existence of the 
notion in question but the presupposition provides 
new information not in the common ground of 
participants. (Essentially, this example can be 
explained in terms of the principle of accommodation 
mentioned in section 2.1 above.) Illustrating with 
more examples, Abbott claims that presuppositions do 
not always provide old information but they are 
nonassertions (in the sense of the non-at-issue 
entailment of an utterance). Remember that implicatures 
were introduced by Grice (1989) as the complement 
of what is said (in the sense of the at-issue-entailment 
of an utterance). Here, we are motivated to explore 
the relation between implicature and presupposition.





(10)  Ontology of Meaning
Meanings
  Entailments
 •  At-issue entailments 
   (not invariably speaker oriented, vary under 
holes, plugs)
 •  Conventional presuppositions 
  (not speaker oriented, backgrounded)
 •  CIs
  Context dependent
 •  Conversational implicatures 
   (not conventional, not speaker oriented, not 
backgrounded)
 •  Conversationally-triggered presuppositions
   (not speaker oriented, backgrounded)
 (Potts, 2005, p. 23, with my modifications)
In (10), presuppositions are classified as either 
conventional or conversationally-triggered. At this 
point, this distinction seems to be related to the classical 
distinction between semantic presupposition and 
pragmatic presupposition as follows: Conventional 
presuppositions are semantic presuppositions or 
conventionally-triggered pragmatic presuppositions, 
whereas conversationally-triggered presuppositions are 
conversationally-triggered pragmatic presuppositions. 
 In light of this ontology, we could critically reconsider 
Bach’s (1999) claim: “to the extent that putative 
conventional implicatures really are implicatures, they 
are not conventional, and to the extent that they are 
conventional they are not implicatures” (p. 338). 
Bach seems to take implicature in the sense of non-
entailment. However, for Grice (1989), implicature 
is the complement of what is said, and what is said 
is used in the sense of the at-issue entailment. Thus, 
in Grice’s sense, being conventional and being an 
implicature are compatible.
 In his later work, Potts provides a typology of a total of 
eight classes of presupposition and implicature, in terms of 
three properties (i.e., conventional, backgrounded, and 
projective) (Potts, 2015). The eight classes are: semantic 
presupposition, local semantic presupposition, pragmatic 
presupposition, local pragmatic presupposition, 
conventional implicature, at-issue entailment, 
conversational implicature, and local conversational 
implicature. In that typology, the difference between 
semantic presupposition and pragmatic presupposition lies 
in conventionality: 
(11)   Semantic presupposition is conventional, whereas 
pragmatic presupposition is not. 
If Potts’s (2005) ontology lines up with Potts’s 
(2015) analysis, then there is no category of 
conventionally-triggered pragmatic presupposition. 
Conventional presuppositions in (10) should be 
semantic presuppositions. In fact, Potts (2005) treats 
expressives (including the tu/vous distinction in the 
second person in French, which Keenan treated as 
generating a pragmatic presuppsition) as generating 
a CI. Potts (2015) also argues that the difference 
between presupposition (both semantic and 
pragmatic) and CI lies in the backgrounded property: 
(12)   Presuppositions are backgrounded, whereas 
CIs are not. 
Thus, the information generated by expressives, if it is 
treated as generating a CI, should be ‘not backgrounded’. 
On an intuitive basis, this is controversial. Potts (2015) 
concludes his analysis by observing “It is easy to 
imagine future theoretical developments leading us 
drop all of these terminological distinctions in favor 
of more abstract concepts from language and social 
cognition” (p. 193).
 Beaver et al. (2009) define “a notion of projective 
meaning  which encompasses both classical 
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presuppositions and phenomena which are usually 
regarded as non-presuppositional but which also 
display projection behavior -- Horn’s assertorically 
inert entailments, conventional implicatures (both 
Grice’s and Potts’) and some conversational 
implicatures” (p. 1, original italics). McCready 
(2010) provides “a system capable of analyzing the 
combinatorics of a wide range of conventionally 
implicated and expressive constructions in natural 
language” (p. 1). Gutzmann (2015) employs a use-
conditional perspective, in addition to the truth-
conditional perspective, and proposes what he calls 
hybrid semantics for the analysis of natural 
language expressions.
 In summary, the notion and classification of 
presupposition vary in the literature, as does the 
treatment of CI. I will now move onto the analysis 
of specific candidate triggers of CIs.
3.   Analysis of Candidate Triggers for 
Conventional Implicatures
 This section analyzes major candidates for triggers 
of CIs, and discusses whether these candidates in 
fact generate CIs or should be considered something 
else. I first discuss the two categories that Potts (2005) 
focuses on (i.e., supplements and expressives). I then 
analyze therefore, which Grice (1989) himself used 
as an example when he introduced the notion of CI. 
Then, I take a few examples from the list of ACIDs 
(“Alleged Conventional Implicature Devices”) 
mentioned in Bach (1999, p. 333), based on Karttunen 
and Peters (1979): They are manage to, even, only, 
and stop ~ing.
 Potts (2005) provides the definition of CI based on 
Grice (1989), as below (Potts, 2005, p. 89, original 
italics).
(13)  a.  CIs are part of the conventional meaning of 
words.
       b.  CIs are commitments, and thus give rise to 
entailments.
       c.  These commitments are made by the speaker 
of the utterance ‘by virtue of the meaning of’ 
the words he chooses.
       d.  CIs are logically and compositionally independent 
of what is ‘said (in the favored sense)’, i.e., 
independent of the at-issue entailments.
(13b) means that CIs are not cancellable. (13d) 
means that CIs do not affect the truth condition of 
the at-issue entailment. In what follows, by 
“ p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ”  I  m e a n  c o n v e n t i o n a l 
presupposition, unless I note otherwise. I will use 
the  fo l lowing  cr i te r ia  to  ident i fy  CI  and 
presupposition in my analysis below: 1) the 
definition of CI given in (13) above, 2) the 
backgrounded property for presuppositions, and 3) 
constancy under negation test for presuppositions.
3.1  Supplements
 Potts (2005) provides a list of examples of 
supplements as below (p. 90, original italics).
(14)  a.  Ames, a successful spy, is now behind bars. 
(nominal appositive)
       b.  Ames was, as the press reported, a successful 
spy. (As-parenthetical)
       c.  Ames, who was a successful spy, is now behind 
bars. (supplementary relative)
       d.  Amazingly, they refused our offer. (speaker-
oriented adverb)
       e.  Thoughtfully, Ed destroyed the evidence for 
us. (topic-oriented adverb)
       f.  Just between you and me, Aldo is a dangerous 
spy. (utterance-modifying adverb)
Below is another example of supplementary relative 
noted in Potts (2005, p. 24).
(15)   ‘I spent part of every summer until I was ten 




class suburb in Boston.’ 
Potts argues that we would think that (15) makes two 
assertions but that “the supplementary relative plays 
a secondary role relative to the information conveyed 
by the main clause” (p. 24). That is, on his view, the 
supplementary relative is committed to a non-at-
issue entailment, and whether the proposition 
expressed by the supplementary relative is true or 
false does not affect the truth condition of the main 
clause. Nominal appositives and as-parentheticals as 
in (14a) and (14b) have the same property. 
 A question arises. As we just saw, Potts (2005) 
claims that “the supplementary relative plays a 
secondary role relative to the information conveyed 
by the main clause” (p. 24). Doesn’t that mean that 
the information given by the supplementary relative is 
backgrounded? Potts (2005, 2015), however, says that 
CIs are not backgrounded. We need a clarification of 
the meaning of the term “backgrounded”. If we 
consider the foregrounded-backgrounded distinction 
in the sense of the figure-ground distinction in Gestalt 
psychology (e.g., Kohler, 1930, p. 169f), then, it may 
well mean the distinction between the primary-
secondary information provided by a sentence. This 
raises the possibility that supplementary relatives are 
conventionally-triggered pragmatic presuppositions.
 In fact, Levinson (1983) analyzes supplements as 
presuppositions, using the following example (p. 179). 
(For the current purpose, ignore the presuppositions 
triggered by regret, stop, and before.) He argues that 
(16b) is a presupposition of (16a).
(16)  a.  John, who is a good friend of mine, regrets 
that he stopped doing linguistics before he 
left Cambridge. 
       b. John is a good friend of the speaker’s.
Levinson applies the constancy under negation test 
as in (17) below.
(17)   John, who is a good friend of mine, doesn’t 
regret that he stopped doing linguistics before 
he left Cambridge. 
Levinson observes that (16b) survives under 
negation (i.e., it holds both in (16a) and (17)), and 
argues that (16b) is a presupposition of (16a). 
 Now, let us stop and have a closer look at the 
relation between (16b) and (16a). Does (16b) always 
hold in (16a)? It should be noted that the requirement 
of (16b) concerns the felicity, not the truth condition, 
of (16a). (16b) and the main clause of (16a) make 
independent statements. Thus, the truth value of (16b) 
does not affect the truth condition of (16a). In other 
words, there is no guarantee that (16b) holds in (16a) 
semantically. If (16b) does not hold in (16a), the result 
is not a truth value gap: (16) has a truth value 
independently. From this, if (16b) is a presupposition 
of (16a), it should be a pragmatic presupposition in 
the classical sense as in Keenan (1971).
 In view of Potts’s (2005) and Levinson’s (1983) 
analyses, whether supplements generate a CI or a 
presupposition depends on whether the information 
provided by supplements is backgrounded or not. 
Thus, we need a clarification of the notion of 
“backgrounded” in order to go any further. 
 Speaker-oriented adverbs as in (12d) and topic-
oriented adverbs as in (12e) seem to both express the 
speaker’s evaluation (in a broad sense) of the main 
clause. Utterance-modifying adverbs as in (12d) modify 
the utterance to follow (or precede). Expressions such as 
to be honest, to tell the truth, and frankly speaking are 
also utterance-modifying adverbs, whereas expressions 
such as to my surprise and to my embarrassment are 
speaker-oriented adverbs.
3.2  Expressives
 The other category that Potts (2005) mentions as 
generating CIs is expressives. Potts mentions Japanese 
verbal (subject) honorification (e.g., Sensei-wa eigo 
ga o-wakari-ni nar-u, ‘The teacher understands 
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English’), expressive attributive adjectives (e.g., Shut 
that blasted window!), and epithets (p. 153, original 
underlines). As I already mentioned, Potts regards the 
tu/vous distinction as generating a CI, rather than a 
pragmatic presupposition (cf. Keenan, 1971). The 
status of the tu/vous distinction can be determined 
based on whether the generated information is 
backgrounded or not, and here again, we need a 
clarification of the notion of “backgrounded”. I will 
not discuss expressives any further, since they are not 
involved in the analysis of other candidate triggers of 
CI to be given below (See Potts [2005] for more 
details).
3.3  Therefore
 I will now analyze therefore in (4), repeated here 
as (18). As noted above, Grice introduced CI with 
the example of therefore. 
(18)   He is an English man; he is, therefore, brave. 
 (Grice, 1989, p.25)
Grice notes that (18) generates a CI that being 
brave is a consequence of being an English man. 
Let us check the definition of CI given in (13) 
above.
 (13a) obviously holds. The consequence meaning 
comes from the conventional meaning of therefore. 
Next, let us check (13b). The continuation of (18) as in 
(19) sounds odd. This indicates that the consequence 
meaning in question is not cancellable, supporting 
(13b).
(19)   He is an English man; he is, therefore, brave. 
Actually, I don’t think English men are brave.
 Next, let us check (13c). By using therefore, the 
speaker states a conclusion and expresses the basis 
for that conclusion. Other people may draw different 
conclusions. Thus, the commitment is made by the 
speaker of the utterance by virtue of the meaning of 
the words s/he chooses (i.e., therefore). That is, (13c) 
holds.
 Finally, let us check (13d). If the person in question 
(i.e., “he” in the sentence) is an English man and he is 
brave, then (18) is true, even if being brave is not a 
consequence of being an English man. Thus, the 
meaning generated by therefore does not affect the 
truth condition of (18). That is, (13d) holds. I have 
just confirmed that therefore in fact generates a CI, 
based on Potts’s (2005) definition of CI given in (13). 
 Next, I will consider the basic format in which 
therefore is used. It is (20a) below. (18) is considered 
to be derived from (20b). 
(20)  a.  P1, P2, … Pn. Therefore, Q. (P1, P2, … Pn, 
and Q are propositions. n ≥ 1)
       b.  He is an English man. Therefore, he is 
brave. (P1 = “He is an English man”, Q = 
“he is brave”)
       c.  P1, P2, … Pn, From this/these, I (hereby) 
conclude that Q.
       d.  He is an English man. From this, I (hereby) 
conclude that he is brave.
 In (20a), the sequence of P1, P2, … Pn (i.e., how 
many preceding sentences are related to therefore) 
are established in the discourse. From the speech act 
perspective (Austin, 1975), (20a) can be paraphrased 
as (20c). Specifically, (20b) is paraphrased as (20d). 
 I analyze that therefore in (20a) does two things. 
For one thing, it expresses the illocutionary force 
of concluding: In saying “Therefore, Q”, the 
speaker makes a conclusion that Q. For another 
thing, therefore refers to the sequence of P1, P2, … 
Pn, which is the basis for making the conclusion. 
This/these in (20c) refers to the sequence of P1, P2, 
… Pn. In this light, I see that therefore is relevant to 
supplements discussed in 3.1 above. I analyze that 
therefore is an utterance-modifying adverb as in 
just between you and me in (14f). What is special 




force of the accompanying utterance (i.e., Q). To 
mention in passing, just between you and me in 
(14f) is a shorter version of this is just between you 
and me. Here, this refers to the utterance modified 
by the adverb. This is relevant to the point that 
therefore refers to the immediately preceding part 
of the discourse (i.e., P1, P2, … Pn).
 Concerning the backgrounded property, the 
information generated by therefore is not backgrounded, 
given that it involves the illocutionary force of the 
modified utterance (i.e., Q). This supports the 
argument that therefore generates a CI, rather than 
a presupposition.
3.4  Manage to
 Next, I analyze manage to, using the examples 
and analysis from Levinson (1983, p. 178).
(21)  John managed to stop in time.
Sentence (21) entails (22a) and (22b).
(22)  a. John stopped in time.
       b. John tried to stop in time.
(22a) is an at-issue entailment and (22b) is a 
secondary entailment. As Levinson says, (22b) 
survives under negation. That is, the negative 
version (23) also entails (22b).
(23)  John didn’t manage to stop in time.
To put it another way, if (22b) does not hold, then 
(21) lacks a truth value. Since the falsity of (22b) 
affects the truth condition of (21), (22b) is a 
presupposition, not a CI.
3.5  Even
 Next, I analyze even as in (24a) below.
(24)  a. Even Fred passed the exam.
       b. Fred passed the exam.
       c.  Fred was among those who were least likely 
to pass the exam.
The  mean ing  o f  u t t e rance  (24a)  has  two 
components, which are (24b) and (24c). (24b) is 
the at-issue entailment. The question is whether 
(24c) is a CI or not. Let us check the definition of 
CI, given in (13), step by step. 
 (13a) obviously holds. The meaning (24c) comes 
from the conventional meaning of even. Next, let 
us check (13b). The continuation of (24a) as in (25) 
sounds odd. Thus, (24c) is not cancellable, and 
(13b) holds.
(25)   Even Fred passed the exam. I thought he was 
doing well.
Next, (13c). The assumption of (24c) is in the speaker’s 
mind, and it needs not be a common evaluation by the 
community. Thus, the commitment is made by the 
speaker of the utterance by virtue of the meaning of 
even. That is, (13c) holds. Finally, let us check (13d). 
Sentence (24a) is true even if Fred was actually doing 
well. Thus, the truth value of (24c) does not affect the 
truth value of (24a), supporting (13d).
 Furthermore, let us apply the constancy under 
negation test to (24a). (24c) does not hold in the negative 
sentence (i.e., Even Fred didn’t pass the exam), indicating 
that (24c) is not a presupposition of (24a).
 From these, I conclude that even generates a CI. 
3.6  Only
 Next, I analyze only. Let us consider (26a). Its 
meaning consists of (26b) and (26c). 
(26)  a. Only Bob came.
       b. Bob came.
       c. Nobody other than Bob came.
(26b) is presumably an at-issue entailment of (26a). 
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(26b) cannot be cancelled as indicated by the 
infelicity of (27): 
(27)   # Only Bob came. In fact, he (=Bob) didn’t 
come.
 Then, what is the status of (26c)? (26a) also 
entails (26c): If (26c) does not hold, (26a) is false. 
Since the truth value of (26c) affects the truth 
condition of (26a), (26c) is not a CI. Furthermore, 
the negation of (26a) (i.e., Only Bob didn’t come) 
does not entail  (26c).  Thus, (26c) is not a 
presupposition of (26a). Therefore, (26c) seems to 
be another at-issue entailment of (26a).
 Abbott (2000) argues that “an ideal assertion is 
one atomic proposition, consisting of one predicate 
with its unanalyzed arguments” (p. 1431). This 
causes a possible problem with the above-mentioned 
view that (24a) has two at-issue entailments, which 
are (24b) and (24c). Abbott (2000) proposes an 
analysis of conjoined and disjoined sentences as a 
sequence of utterances. However, it does not seem to 
be appropriate to reduce (24a) to a conjunction of 
(24b) and (24c). Thus, for the moment, we could 
analyze that (24a) has an at-issue entailment in a 
hybrid structure consisting of (24b) and (24c).
3.7  Stop ~ing
 Next, I analyze a change of state predicate stop 
~ing in (6), repeated here as (28). 
(28)  Susan stopped beating her boyfriend.
As we saw in (6), stop ~ing generates a presupposition, 
given that it passes the constancy under negation test. 
Now, let us consider the backgrounded property. In 
(28), the fact that Susan was beating her boyfriend is 
backgrounded. Then, how about (29a)?
(29)  a.  Susan is not beating her boyfriend. She 
stopped doing so.
       b. Susan was beating her boyfriend.
In the second sentence in (29a), the information (29b) 
generated by stop ~ing seems to be foregrounded. (The 
first sentence in (29a) just mentions the current state of 
affairs. In the second sentence in (29a), there appears to 
be a stress on “stopped”.) Thus, it is possible to 
consider that (29b) is a CI, not a presupposition, of the 
second sentence of (29a). This observation indicates 
that the same expression (i.e., stop ~ing in this case) 
can generate either a presupposition or a CI, depending 
on the context in which it appears.
4.   Relation between Conventional 
Implicature and Presupposition
4.1  Summary of Observations
 In section 3, I examined some candidate triggers 
of CI. I analyzed them based on the definition of CI 
given in Potts (2005) (i.e., (13)), the backgrounded 
property for presuppositions, and the constancy 
under negation test for presuppositions. The results 
are as follows.
 Supplements can be analyzed to generate either 
CIs or presuppositions. The difference between CI 
and presupposition lies in the backgrounded property 
(Potts, 2015). The examples of supplements I examined 
make secondary entailments, providing new 
information. If we attribute secondary entailments to 
the backgrounded property, then supplements can be 
analyzed to generate pragmatic presuppositions. If 
we attribute the new information to the non-
backgrounded property, then supplements can be 
analyzed to generate CIs. To go any further, we need a 
clarification of the notion of the backgrounded 
property. If supplements are considered to generate 
backgrounded information whose truth value does not 
affect the truth condition of the main clause, we would 
need subcategories of conventional presupposition: 
semantic presupposition, which affects the truth value 




which does not affect the truth value of the main 
clause. Alternatively, we could remove the condition 
of the backgrounded property from CI. The same 
holds for expressives.
 Therefore is analyzed to generate a CI, given that it 
has the non-backgrounded property. Importantly, I 
analyzed that therefore involves the presentation of 
the illocutionary force of the accompanying utterance.
 Manage to generates a semantic presupposition, 
based on the constancy under negation test as well 
as the effect that it has on the truth condition of the 
main entailment.
 Even generates a CI. 
 Only generates neither a CI nor a presupposition. 
It can be analyzed to make an at-issue entailment in 
a hybrid structure, consisting of two entailments.
 Change of state predicates such as stop ~ing 
generate either a CI or a presupposition, depending 
on the context in which they appear, in view of the 
backgrounded property.
4.2  Feedback to the Ontology of Meaning
 There could be a case in which a lexical item or 
construction generates a meaning which is backgrounded 
and speaker oriented. Supplements indicate such a 
possibility, as we saw in section 3.1. The ontology 
proposed by Potts (2005) as illustrated in (10) assumes 
that CI are not backgrounded, whereas conventional 
presuppositions are backgrounded and not speaker 
oriented. A suggestion that I would make is to remove 
the non- backgrounded property from the criteria for CI. 
Furthermore, we could also remove the speaker oriented 
property. In doing so, we could focus on the property 
concerning whether or not the truth value of the 
generated information affects the truth condition of the 
at-issue entailment. In that case, under the category of 
entailments, we would have semantic presupposition, 
which affects the truth condition of the main entailment, 
on the one hand, and the union of CI and (conventional) 
pragmatic presupposition on the other, which does not 
affect the truth condition of the at-issue entailment.
5.  Concluding Remarks
 This paper first overviewed the historical background 
and recent work on the notion and property of 
implicature and presupposition. It then investigated 
major candidates for the triggers of CI and discussed 
the relation between CI and presupposition. The status 
of CI in the ontology of meaning can vary depending 
on the key notions used for distinguishing different 
kinds of meaning. In Potts’s (2005) ontology, the 
definition of backgrounded property, among others, 
plays a crucial role in the identification of CI and needs 
more clarification. As an alternative, it was suggested 
to focus on the property concerning whether or not the 
truth value of the generated information has an effect 
on the truth condition of the at-issue entailment. In that 
case, under the category of entailments, we would have 
semantic presupposition, which affects the truth 
condition of the main entailment, on the one hand, and 
the union of CI and (conventional) pragmatic 
presupposition on the other, which does not affect the 
truth condition of the at-issue entailment. Both CI and 
presupposition deserve an independent label but their 
definition and properties leave room for clarification.
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